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AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON TAKEOUT 
MENUS: NEW YORK’S LAWN LITTER LAW 
Brooks H. Leonard ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nothing is more annoying than coming home and finding a pile 
of restaurant takeout menus on your doorstep.  But that annoyance 
can soon fade to relief when you realize there is nothing to eat in 
your fridge and dinner is just a phone call away.  Whether it is an 
enormous soda ad that blocks out the sun or an 8½ x 11-inch tri-fold 
pamphlet displaying a new restaurant’s menu, Americans have a love-
hate relationship with advertising.  On the one hand, advertising is a 
driving force behind our capitalist economy.  On the other, the coun-
try is saturated with it and longs to tune it out.  Although appealing 
when entertaining, advertising at the same time is loathed for its om-
nipresence.  So much, in fact, that people—annoyed citizens and 
lawmakers alike—tend to forget that advertising is protected under 
our Constitution. 
Historically, a struggle has occurred between organizations as-
serting their First Amendment right to advertise and individuals 
claiming that their privacy interests protect them from unwanted dis-
tractions.
1
  On a basic level, some citizens simply do not want to be 
bothered by the exposure to excess commercial information.  But 
many businesses depend on advertising as an important method of 
attracting customers, and small businesses cannot always feasibly sell 
their products to the masses by large-scale means.  Thus, businesses 
are constantly directing their marketing campaigns toward potential 
customers in budget-friendly ways.  One cost-effective method that 
 
 ∗ J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A., 2005, Indiana University; 
B.A., 2003, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  I would like to thank Profes-
sor Angela Carmella, Seton Hall University School of Law, for her invaluable assis-
tance in preparing this Comment.  Thanks also go to my wife and family, without 
whose support this endeavor would not have been possible. 
 1 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
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businesses use is circulating handbills or flyers.
2
  This method is inex-
pensive; businesses generally only incur printing costs and the no-
minal expenses associated with hand delivery.  Handbills in the form 
of takeout menus are especially prevalent in the restaurant business. 
Unfortunately for these businesses, many citizens particularly 
dislike this method of advertising.
3
  Instead of passively subjecting a 
television viewer or radio listener to an advertisement that the viewer 
or listener can simply tune out, a handbill’s physical presence neces-
sitates an active response.  One must actually do something with the 
advertisement upon receipt.  If the government has a duty to protect 
its citizens, the problem seems easy enough to fix—implement an 
outright prohibition of this type of business advertising.  It would be 
logical to allow citizens to exclude these types of advertisements from 
their property.  This is exactly what the City of New York (or the 
“City”) has done. 
In 2007, the New York State Legislature passed a law that prohi-
bits a person from placing advertising materials on private property if 
the owner of the property has posted a sign prohibiting such mate-
rials.
4
  Although this legislation might have the effect of reducing lit-
ter, keeping our streets cleaner, and decreasing annoyance to citi-
zens, it inescapably violates the First Amendment
5
 rights of 
businesses.  The State of New York completely disregards that the 
Constitution protects commercial speech almost to the same extent 
as it protects noncommercial speech.
6
 
This Comment uses the example of takeout menus to argue that 
New York General Business Law § 397-a (“Lawn Litter Law”) violates 
 
 2 Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 (“Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to 
the poorly financed causes of little people.”). 
 3 See John J. Doherty, Lawn Litter Law, QUEENS COURIER, Aug. 6, 2008, 
http://www.queenscourier.com/articles/2008/08/06/news/opinion/op_ed/news0
1.txt.  John J. Doherty currently serves as the New York City Commissioner of Sanita-
tion.  Id.  
 4 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 397-a(1) (Consol. 2007 & Supp. 2009).  The law reads as 
follows: 
In any city with a population of one million or more, no person shall 
place, or cause or permit to be placed on private property any unsoli-
cited papers, fliers, pamphlets, handbills, circulars, or other materials 
advertising a business or soliciting business where the owner has post-
ed, in a conspicuous location, a sign stating that the placement of such 
materials shall be prohibited. 
Id. 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech.”). 
 6 See infra Part 0. 
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the principles of the commercial speech doctrine.  Under the com-
mercial speech doctrine, the Central Hudson test mandates that any 
regulation that limits nonmisleading commercial speech must be 
supported by a substantial governmental interest.
7
  Furthermore, the 
regulation must directly advance this interest and must not be more 
extensive than necessary.
8
  The City of New York has advanced five in-
terests justifying the Lawn Litter Law: litter, crime, safety, nuisance, 
and privacy.
9
  This Comment argues that although preventing crime, 
keeping citizens safe, and protecting citizens’ privacy are substantial 
interests, keeping the streets free from litter and preventing nuisance 
are not substantial interests.  Furthermore, even if all five of the City’s 
interests could be considered substantial, the Lawn Litter Law is un-
constitutional because it does not directly advance the stated interest, 
because it is more extensive than necessary, or because of both such 
reasons.  That is, for each of its asserted interests, the City fails the 
Central Hudson test on at least one of the four prongs. 
This Comment concludes that because the Lawn Litter Law does 
not withstand analysis under the relevant test, it is unconstitutional.  
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the Lawn Litter Law 
from its passage by the New York State Legislature to its implementa-
tion by the City.  This section also discusses the structure and mean-
ing of the law.  Part III outlines the development of the First 
Amendment jurisprudence relevant to commercial speech starting 
with the decision to extend free-speech protection to commercial 
speech.  Part IV analyzes the Lawn Litter Law from the perspective of 
the commercial speech doctrine, discusses other implications of the 
law, and addresses some ways to advance the governmental interests 
that do not infringe on the commercial speech rights of businesses.  
Part V argues that the New York Legislature should amend the Lawn 
Litter Law to both serve the interests of the government and conform 
to the Constitution. 
 
 7 Id.  This Comment assumes that the business advertisements at issue are not 
misleading. 
 8 Id. 
 9 DEP’T OF SANITATION, CITY OF N.Y., NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF FINAL RULES 
GOVERNING THE DISTRIB. OF ADVER. ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–5, available at 
www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/downloads/pdf/rules/noa/llrule.pdf. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK’S LAWN LITTER LAW 
A. The Passage of the Lawn Litter Law 
On August 15, 2007, the representatives in New York’s Senate 
and Assembly voted to amend the General Business Law through the 
addition of a new section.
10
  The legislature passed this amendment to 
the General Business Law as Chapter 585 of the 2007 laws of New 
York State.
11
  Assembly Members representing all five boroughs of 
New York City introduced this bill.
12
  Both the Assembly and the Se-
nate passed the bill, which the Governor subsequently signed into 
law; the Legislature later amended the law.
13
 
The core addition to the General Business Law was that the new 
section prohibited the distribution of unsolicited business advertise-
ments on private property; section 585 applied only to cities with a 
population of one million or more people and provided specifically 
that 
no person shall place, or cause or permit to be placed on private 
property any papers, fliers, pamphlets, handbills, circulars, or 
other materials advertising a business or soliciting business where 
the owner has posted a sign stating that the placement of such 
materials shall be prohibited unless expressly permitted in writing 
by the owner of such private property.
14
 
On the same day that the legislature passed the law, Governor 
Eliot Spitzer issued a memorandum that noted certain deficiencies in 
it.
15
  Governor Spitzer observed that some property owners in New 
York City were “frustrated by the inconvenience, nuisance and litter 
caused by the repeated delivery of unwelcome advertising circulars to 
their property.”
16
  But the memorandum also suggested that some 
areas of the bill needed work to bring the bill in line with First 
Amendment jurisprudence.
17
  These concerns included that the bill 
permitted landlords to “bar tenants from receiving advertising circu-
 
 10 See 2007 N.Y. Laws 585, § 1.  
 11 Id. 
 12 Id.  The members of the Assembly who introduced the bill were Mark Weprin 
(Queens County), James F. Brennan (Kings County), Barbara M. Clark (Queens 
County), Rory I. Lancman (Queens County), Andrew Hevesi (Queens County), 
Naomi Rivera (Bronx County), Aurelia Greene (Bronx County), and Keith L.T. 
Wright (New York County). 
 13 See 2008 N.Y. Laws 3. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Governor’s Approval Memorandum, 2007 N.Y. Laws 34. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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lars,” placed small or new businesses at a financial disadvantage by 
requiring them to use other advertising means, failed to name an en-
forcement mechanism or enforcement agency, and lacked a standard 
for a property owner’s notice of prohibition.
18
  The Governor signed 
the bill into law in spite of its deficiencies because of the legislature’s 
noted willingness to amend the law as soon as possible.
19
 
As a result of the Governor’s memorandum, the legislature 
amended the law on January 28, 2008, to incorporate some of the 
proposed changes.
20
  Senator Padavan of Queens County, a county 
purportedly plagued by advertising litter,
21
 sponsored this amend-
ment.
22
  The changes to the law required a property owner to post the 
sign “in a conspicuous location” if he wished to prohibit the mate-
rials.
23
  The amendment clarified the rights of owners as well as ren-
ters and established guidelines for the format of the sign.
24
  Moreover, 
the amendment provided that the mayor of the city is to designate an 
enforcement agency to promulgate rules for the law’s implementa-
tion.
25
  Finally, the amendment clarified the civil penalties for viola-
tions and the notice required for each violation.
26
  The law took effect 
on November 15, 2007; ninety days after Governor Spitzer signed it.
27
  
Each city seeking to implement the law, however, is required to have 
the enforcement agency in place before issuing violations and collect-
ing fines.
28
 
B. The Lawn Litter Law’s Statutory Structure 
Section 1 of the Lawn Litter Law sets out the prohibition of 
commercial advertising materials and establishes rights for property 
owners and lessees.
29
  This law only applies to cities with a population 
of one million or more people.
30
  The law provides that no one shall 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See 2008 N.Y. Laws 3, § 1. 
 21 See Doherty, supra note 3. 
 22 See S.B. 6477, 2008 Leg., 231st Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
 23 2008 N.Y. Laws 3, § 1. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. 
 27 Id. § 2. 
 28 Id. 
 29 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 397-a(1) (Consol. 2007 & Supp. 2009). 
 30 Id.  As of July 1, 2006, the only city in New York State that meets this require-
ment is New York City.  U.S. Census Bureau, New York—Place and County Subdivi-
sion, Population Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?-
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“place, or cause or permit to be placed on private property any mate-
rials advertising a business or soliciting business” if the owner has 
placed a sign on the property prohibiting such material.
31
  The prop-
erty owner or manager must place the sign in a “conspicuous loca-
tion.”
32
  If the property is owner occupied and is either a single-family 
home or is designed for and used by no more than three families, on-
ly the owner of the building has the authority to post the sign.
33
  For 
all other multiple-family dwellings, the owner or manager has the au-
thority to post the sign only if every owner or lessee in the building 
agrees to prohibit the specified materials.
34
 
A sign is invalid under the law if one of the owners or lessees of a 
building fails to consent to its posting.
35
  If at least one owner or les-
see in the building does not wish to prohibit such material, the owner 
of the property may post a sign that designates a place for unsolicited 
advertising.
36
  The sign must specify the number of owners or lessees 
who do not wish to prohibit the advertising, and the owner must 
permit the advertiser to leave only that number of copies in the des-
ignated receptacle.
37
  The receptacle must be “reasonably accessible” 
to the owners or lessees and to the advertisers.
38
  Notably, this law 
does not prohibit any materials that come through the United States 
Postal Service,
39
 including “sample copies of newspapers regularly 
sold by the copy or by annual subscription or sale”
40
 and “coupon 
newspapers and magazines containing more than a deminimus 
amount of news that are published at least weekly.”
41
 
Section 2 describes the minimum requirements for the appear-
ance of the sign.
42
  The sign must be five inches tall and seven inches 
wide with the lettering on the sign at least one inch tall.
43
  The sign 
 
ds_name=PEP_2006_EST&-mt_name=PEP_2006_EST_GCTT1R_ST9S&-
geo_id=04000US36&-format=ST-9&-tree_id=806&-context=gct (last visited July 10, 
2010). 
 31 § 397-a(1). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 § 397-a(1). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 § 397-a(2).   
 43 Id. 
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must read, “Do Not Place Unsolicited Advertising Materials On This 
Property.”
44
  Where a multiple-family building has owners who do not 
wish to prohibit the advertising, the sign (following the above specifi-
cations) must designate how much material the advertiser is permit-
ted to leave and the particular location at which the advertiser may 
place it.
45
 
Section 3 sets out a presumption for the violation of this law.
46
  It 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the “person whose name, tele-
phone number, or other identifying information appears on any un-
solicited advertising materials” placed at two or more premises is lia-
ble for violating the Lawn Litter Law.
47
 
Section 4 relates to penalties.
48
  The mayor chooses the agency 
responsible for enforcing the law.
49
  Section 4 imposes a civil penalty 
of no less than $250 and not more than $1000 for each violation, but 
the total amount of the penalty may not exceed $5000 for one day.
50
  
Furthermore, “[e]ach unauthorized placement of materials at a sin-
gle location where a sign is posted . . . shall be considered a separate 
violation of this section.”
51
  The environmental control board of the 
city has the authority to impose the civil penalty provided that suffi-
cient notice of the violation was given.
52
  Moreover, Section 4 requires 
that all of the penalties collected be “paid into the general fund of 
[the] city.”
53
 
Finally, Section 5 authorizes the mayor’s selected agency “to 
promulgate rules to effectuate these provisions.”
54
 
C. Enacting the Lawn Litter Law in New York City 
On February 20, 2008, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
appointed the New York City Department of Sanitation (DSNY) as 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 § 397-a(3). 
 47 Id.  Currently, legislation is pending in the Senate that would delete this pre-
sumption’s requirement that the material be placed at two or more locations.  A.B. 
7862, 2009 Leg., 232nd Sess. (N.Y. 2009). 
 48 § 397-a(4). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 § 397-a(5). 
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the enforcement agency for the Lawn Litter Law.
55
  The DSNY then 
proposed a series of rules to implement the law
56
 and set the penalty 
for each violation at $250.
57
  The original proposal for this law re-
quired owners who wished to report violations to provide a notarized 
affidavit with the complaint.
58
  After receiving considerable negative 
feedback from the public, however, the DSNY decided to require only 
a signed affidavit.
59
 
On August 5, 2008, the DSNY began enforcing the Lawn Litter 
Law.  The public has reacted favorably to the law,
60
 especially after the 
DSNY eliminated the notary requirement.
61
  Although some believe 
that the law is an effective way to solve the litter problem, others 
doubt that the government will enforce it.
62
  Clearly, many businesses 
are displeased with the law.
63
  But some business owners maintain that 
 
 55 DEP’T OF SANITATION, CITY OF N.Y., NOTICE OF PUB. HEARING AND OPPORTUNITY 
TO COMMENT ON: PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING THE DISTRIB. OF ADVER. ON PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 3 (June 4, 2008), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dsny/ 
downloads/pdf/rules/lawn_litter/transcripts/transcript.pdf. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 10:7. 
 58 DEP’T OF SANITATION, CITY OF N.Y., NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF FINAL RULES 
GOVERNING THE DISTRIB. OF ADVER. ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 5, available at 
www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/downloads/pdf/rules/noa/llrule.pdf. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See, e.g., Sue Wolfe, Lawn Litter Be Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, at 9 (“We are 
delighted that the city has started enforcing a recent state law that prohibits ‘lawn 
litter’ if a property owner has posted a sign saying such materials are not wanted.”). 
 61 Frank Lombardi, Li’l Lawn Litter Relief.  Law Fines Advertisers for Unwanted Ma-
terial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7, 2008, at 53 (“In a major regulatory change . . . proper-
ty owners will not have to get their complaints notarized.  That proposed rule was 
dropped by the Sanitation Department because it would have put an undue burden 
on property owners.”); see also ‘Lawn Litter Law’ Final Rules Established, 877 JUNK LAW, 
2008, http://www. 
877junklaw.org/lawn-litter-law-final-rules-established/ (quoting New York State Sena-
tor Frank Padavan as saying that “I commend the City and the Department of Sanita-
tion for working in good faith and making the complaint and enforcement process 
of the ‘Lawn Litter Law’ easier for homeowners throughout the five boroughs”). 
 62 Richard Gentilviso, Lawn Litter Law Poses Enforcement Problems, QUEENS GAZETTE, 
Sept. 24, 2008, at 22, available at http://www.qgazette.com/news/2008-09-
24/features/026.html (“[Department of Sanitation] Assistant Chief for Enforcement 
Todd Kuznitz said there are still problems with the law.  ‘It is a difficult law to en-
force,’ he said at the September meeting of the Queens Borough Cabinet.  ‘The 
problem is First Amendment rights.’”). 
 63 Sewell Chan, An Effort to Halt Unwanted Paper Deliveries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, 
at B1 (“Business owners expressed displeasure with the law.  ‘It’s not good,’ said Lin-
da Chang, manager of the Hunan Wok, a Chinese restaurant in Park Slope [Brook-
lyn].  ‘I believe I lose something, and the customer loses something, too.  Some 
people enjoy the fliers.  Not many people complain to us.’”). 
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the law has not affected them because they have progressed from 
door-to-door advertising to advertising over the Internet.
64
 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
A. The Origins of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
In 1942, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
First Amendment did not protect commercial speech.
65
  In Valentine 
v. Chrestensen, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a sanitation 
statute that prohibited “distribution in the streets of commercial and 
business advertising matter.”
66
  The Court reasoned that the legisla-
ture could regulate commercial advertising because the Constitution 
does not specifically provide otherwise.
67
  In Chrestensen, the legisla-
ture did not have to permit what it believed was the interference with 
and undesirable invasion of the people’s right to fully and freely use 
public roads for their intended purpose.
68
 
The Supreme Court did not decide that the Constitution pro-
tects commercial speech until 1976.  In Virginia State Board of Pharma-
cy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court struck down a por-
tion of the Virginia Code that deemed a licensed pharmacist as 
engaging in unprofessional conduct upon “publish[ing], adver-
tis[ing] or promot[ing], directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit 
terms . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescrip-
tion.”
69
  If the Board found a licensed pharmacist guilty of unprofes-
sional conduct, it could revoke the pharmacist’s license or impose a 
 
 64 Joyce Hanson, New Leaflet Law No Big Deal, Say Restaurateurs, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUSINESS, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.crainsnewyork.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20080808/FREE/126587351/1040/breaking.  The article explains, 
But the restaurant industry, a target of the new law, is seemingly not 
worried.  Many restaurateurs who do a lot of delivery business say the 
law won’t affect them because they stopped dropping leaflets years ago.  
“Today, it’s all on the Internet,” says Antonio Assenso, owner of mid-
town Manhattan trattoria La Cucina Di Antonio.  “We don’t need to 
leave fliers.”  
Id. 
 65 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes 
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”). 
 66 Id. at 53. 
 67 Id. at 54. 
 68 Id. at 54–55. 
 69 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
749–50 (1976) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974)).   
LEONARD FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:14 PM 
1784 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1775 
civil monetary penalty.
70
  Because only licensed pharmacists could 
lawfully dispense these drugs in Virginia, all pharmacist advertising 
was essentially prohibited.
71
  Interestingly, this suit was brought not by 
pharmacists but by consumers suffering from diseases that required 
daily prescription drugs.
72
 
The consumers claimed that the First Amendment entitled con-
sumers of prescription drugs to obtain pricing information from 
pharmacists through advertising.
73
  The Court acknowledged that the 
First Amendment protects the right to receive information.
74
  Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that “[i]f there is a right to advertise, 
there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be as-
serted by these [consumers].”
75
  In arguing that commercial speech is 
outside the realm of First Amendment protection, the Board cited 
Chrestensen.
76
  The Court recognized that commercial speech had tra-
ditionally been an exception to First Amendment protection, but it 
also suggested that more recent cases had not been faithful to this 
proposition.
77
  The Court framed the issue as whether commercial 
speech falls outside of First Amendment protection.
78
 
 
 70 Id. at 752. 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at 753. 
 73 Id. at 754. 
 74 Id. at 757 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)).  
 75 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757. 
 76 See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 77 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759–60.  In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 
(1975), the Court explained, 
[T]he holding [in Chrestensen] is distinctly a limited one: the ordinance 
was upheld as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which com-
mercial advertising could be distributed.  The fact that it had the effect 
of banning a particular handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is au-
thority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial ad-
vertising are immune from constitutional challenge.  The case obvious-
ly does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is 
unprotected per se.  This Court’s cases decided since Chrestensen clearly 
demonstrate as untenable any reading of that case that would give it so 
broad an effect. 
Id. at 819–20; see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (“There is some doubt concerning whether the ‘commercial 
speech’ distinction announced in [Chrestensen] retains continuing validity.”) (citation 
omitted); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513–14 (1959) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“[Chrestensen] . . . held that business advertisements and commercial 
matters did not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment, made applicable to the 
States by the Fourteenth.  The ruling was casual, almost offhand.”). 
 78 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760–61. 
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The Court answered that commercial speech is not “so removed 
from any ‘exposition of ideas[]’ . . . that it lacks all protection.”
79
  In 
addition, the Court stated that simply because an advertiser’s interest 
is economic does not mean its First Amendment protection is abro-
gated.
80
  Furthermore, the Court found two additional factors that 
weighed in favor of allowing advertising: the consumers had a general 
interest in the free flow of commercial information, and the individ-
uals most affected by the statute were the poor, sick, and elderly.
81
  
The Court also found that society has an “interest in the free flow of 
commercial information”
82
 to facilitate “intelligent and well in-
formed” decisions.
83
 
On the other hand, the Court also acknowledged interests in fa-
vor of prohibiting this type of advertising.  It noted that advertising 
might prevent pharmacists from giving professional services in the 
“compounding, handling, and dispensing of prescription drugs.”
84
  
Moreover, the Court hypothesized that advertising might lead to low-
er prices, which could run “the more painstaking and conscientious 
pharmacists” out of business.
85
  The majority stated that advertising 
would lead to price shopping and result in a loss of “stable pharmac-
ist-customer relationships.”
86
  Finally, the Court suggested that adver-
tising would damage the “professional image of the pharmacist.”
87
 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the justifications for 
prohibiting advertising were based on “the advantages of [the con-
sumers] being kept in ignorance.”
88
  These justifications reinforced 
that the First Amendment protects the free flow of this type of infor-
mation.
89
  The Court, however, limited its holding by stating that it 
“[does] not hold that [commercial speech] can never be regulated in 
any way.”
90
  That is, the government may still regulate commercial 
 
 79 Id. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. at 763. 
 82 Id. at 764. 
 83 Id. at 765. 
 84 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 767–68. 
 85 Id. at 768. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 769. 
 89 Id. at 770. 
 90 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
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speech by time, place, and manner restrictions in addition to regula-
tions based on whether the speech is in any way false or misleading.
91
 
B. The Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine Under Central Hudson 
The Supreme Court established the modern test for commercial 
speech protection in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission of New York.
92
  This case arose out of an appeal of the 
New York Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold a complete ban on 
advertisements of electricity services.
93
  The Court began by address-
ing the protection of commercial speech generally as decided in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy.
94
  It explained that the Constitution af-
fords a “lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression.”
95
  The Central Hudson Court 
stated that the First Amendment concern at issue involved the “in-
formational function of advertising.”
96
  The Court established that as 
long as the commercial speech is not misleading or related to an un-
lawful activity, the power of the government to regulate that speech is 
limited.
97
  A state seeking to regulate this speech must first “assert a 
substantial interest” for doing so.
98
  The regulation “must be in pro-
portion to that interest”
99
 and “must be designed carefully to achieve 
the State’s goal.”
100
  The Court established two criteria for this last re-
quirement: “[T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest 
involved[,] . . . [and] if the governmental interest could be served as 
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the exces-
sive restrictions cannot survive.”
101
  Essentially, the Court set out a 
four-part test for commercial speech: (1) the speech “must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading,” (2) the governmental interest 
must be substantial, (3) the regulation must directly advance that go-
 
 91 Id. at 771. 
 92 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 562; see also Part III.A. 
 95 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 564. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
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vernmental interest, and (4) the regulation must not be more exten-
sive than necessary.
102
 
The Court applied this test to the facts before it and established 
that no allegation was made that the speech was either misleading or 
that it related to unlawful activity.
103
  The State asserted two interests 
for its ban on promotional advertising: energy conservation and a 
concern that rates be fair and efficient.
104
  The Court concluded that 
both of these governmental interests were substantial.
105
  The Court 
then turned to “the relationship between the State’s interests and the 
advertising ban.”
106
  As to the second asserted interest, “the impact of 
promotional advertising on the equity of appellant’s rates [was] high-
ly speculative,”
107
 and this could not justify restricting the speech at 
issue.
108
  On the other hand, the State’s interest in conserving energy 
was directly advanced by the ban
109
 because “[t]here is an immediate 
connection between advertising and demand for electricity.”
110
 
After suggesting that the fourth prong of the test was the most 
critical issue in the case, the Court concluded that the energy-
conservation rationale did not justify the outright ban on all promo-
tional advertising.
111
  The ban prevented the advertisement of “elec-
tric services that would reduce energy use by diverting demand from 
less efficient sources, or that would consume roughly the same 
amount of energy as do alternative sources.”
112
  Moreover, the gov-
ernment did not demonstrate that a more limited regulation was in-
adequate to protect its conservation interest.
113
  The Court concluded 
that it was not overlooking the importance of energy conservation but 
that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that the restric-
tion be no more extensive than is necessary to serve the state inter-
est.”
114
  Thus, the ban on commercial speech at issue was unconstitu-
tional because it was more extensive than necessary. 
 
 102 Id. at 566. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 568–69. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 569. 
 107 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 569–70. 
 112 Id. at 570. 
 113 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570–71. 
 114 Id. at 571–72. 
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C. Cases Interpreting the Central Hudson Test 
Before Central Hudson, the concept of “commercial speech” was 
illustrated in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy by the following proposi-
tion: “I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.”
115
  The 
Court, also prior to Central Hudson, stated that it takes a “common-
sense” view of commercial speech.
116
  The decision in Central Hudson 
drastically broadened this viewpoint when the Court stated, “Com-
mercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the 
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest 
in the fullest possible dissemination of information.”
117
  A speaker, 
however, will not be able to circumvent commercial-speech status 
simply by including “advertising that links a product to a current pub-
lic debate.”
118
  In the years following Central Hudson, the Supreme 
Court has considered—on several occasions—the threshold question 
of what defines commercial speech. 
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court rejected a chal-
lenge to the commercial-speech characterization of advertisements 
discussing venereal disease and family planning.
119
  It quoted Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy for the proposition that commercial speech is 
“speech which does no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion.”
120
  But some limitations are placed on this earlier definition; 
simply because material is conceded to be an advertisement does not 
mean that it is commercial speech.
121
  Furthermore, an advertisement 
is not necessarily commercial just because it references a specific 
product
122
 or because it was motivated by economic gains.
123
  In Bolger, 
the combination of all three of these ideas convinced the Court that 
the advertising was commercial.
124
 
Similarly, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. 
Fox, the Court held that intertwining commercial speech with non-
commercial speech did not afford commercial speech the same level 
 
 115 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
761 (1976). 
 116 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978). 
 117 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62. 
 118 Id. at 563 n.5. 
 119 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983). 
 120 Id. at 66 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id.  
 123 Id. at 67. 
 124 Id. 
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of protection that noncommercial speech receives.
125
  If nothing in 
the regulation at issue “prevents the speaker from conveying, or the 
audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing 
in the nature of things requires them to be combined with commer-
cial messages,” the Central Hudson test controls.
126
 
In addition to interpreting this threshold question, courts have 
interpreted each of the four prongs of the Central Hudson test.  As for 
the first prong, the commercial speech must concern lawful activity 
and must not be misleading.  The Central Hudson Court noted that 
inaccurate messages are not constitutionally protected.
127
  Courts may 
regulate advertising that is inherently likely to be deceptive or that 
has actually proved to deceive.
128
 
The second prong of the test deals with the government’s as-
serted interest underlying the regulation; the governmental interest 
must be substantial.
129
  At least one circuit court has held that to find 
an interest to be substantial the interest must be legitimate in theory 
and must remedy a problem that in fact exists.
130
  Among those inter-
 
 125 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989). 
 126 Id.  Some argue that the lower courts use the following three factors in decid-
ing whether speech is commercial: (1) if the speech is an advertisement, (2) if the 
speech refers to a specific product, and (3) if there is an economic motivation be-
hind the speech.  Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech: A New Analyti-
cal Framework for the 21st Century, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. 127, 144 (2007). 
 127 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
563 (1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of com-
mercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”); see 
also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993). 
 128 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (“[R]egulation—and imposition of dis-
cipline—are permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to dece-
ive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has 
in fact been deceptive.”).  See also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Su-
preme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), in which the Court explained, 
The advertisement makes no mention of the distinction between “legal 
fees” and “costs,” and to a layman not aware of the meaning of these 
terms of art, the advertisement would suggest that employing appellant 
would be a no-lose proposition in that his representation in a losing 
cause would come entirely free of charge.  The assumption that sub-
stantial numbers of potential clients would be so misled is hardly a spe-
culative one: it is a commonplace that members of the public are often 
unaware of the technical meanings of such terms as “fees” and “costs”[] 
. . . . 
Id. at 652. 
 129 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 130 Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996) (“To find a 
‘substantial interest,’ a court must conclude both that the interest advanced by the 
state is legitimate in theory, and that that interest is in remedying a problem that ex-
ists in fact (or probably would exist, but for the challenged legislation).”). 
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ests that the Court has found to be substantial are traffic regula-
tions,
131
 aesthetic improvement,
132
 aesthetic preservation through the 
reduction of litter,
133
 temperance,
134
 and energy conservation.
135
  
When a state takes a paternalistic view of a particular activity (that is, 
when the government seeks to protect its citizens from something it 
deems “bad” or to keep consumers in ignorance), the Court will like-
ly find no substantial interest.
136
 
The third prong asks whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest.
137
  The regulation cannot advance the in-
terest in an ineffective or remote way;
138
 rather, the regulation must 
advance that interest in a direct and material way.
139
  Moreover, the 
government must prove that the harms at issue are real and that the 
law will aid in alleviating those harms to a material degree.
140
  The 
 
 131 Supersign of Boca Raton, Inc., v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 766 F.2d 1528, 1530 
(11th Cir. 1985) (“The objectives served by the ordinance, traffic regulation and aes-
thetic improvement, undoubtedly qualify as substantial governmental interests.”). 
 132 Id.  
 133 Sciarrino, 83 F.3d at 367–68 (holding states have a substantial interest in “pre-
serving aesthetics through the reduction of litter”). 
 134 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996). 
 135 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
568 (1980). 
 136 See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 510 (“[A] state legislature does not have the 
broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic 
purposes . . . .”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding that a state may not suppress lawful information 
because it fears the effect that this information will have on the public).  But see Po-
sadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (“The legisla-
ture could conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are al-
ready aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by 
widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct.”). 
 137 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 138 Id. at 564 (“[T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffec-
tive or remote support for the government’s purpose.”); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc., 
517 U.S. at 504–05 (“In evaluating the ban’s effectiveness in advancing the State’s 
interest, we note that a commercial speech regulation ‘may not be sustained if it pro-
vides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.’” (quoting 
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564)). 
 139 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (“[W]e must ask whether the 
State’s interests in proscribing [the speech] are substantial, whether the challenged 
regulation advances these interests in a direct and material way . . . .”); see also Rubin 
v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767). 
 140 Edenfield, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) (“[A] governmental body seeking to sus-
tain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites 
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”); see 
also 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 505; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486. 
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government can meet this burden by reference to studies and anec-
dotal evidence.
141
 
Under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test the regulation 
must not be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted in-
terest.
142
  The Court has limited the fit not to one of perfection but to 
one of reasonableness and narrow tailoring.
143
  Even though the least-
restrictive-means test does not necessarily apply here,
144
 finding means 
of achieving the same goal without limiting speech may serve as evi-
dence that the restriction is more extensive than necessary.
145
 
IV. THE LAWN LITTER LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Lawn Litter Law is unconstitutional under a Central Hudson 
analysis; thus, the court should strike it down if the legislature leaves 
it unamended.  The speech that this law seeks to regulate is clearly 
commercial.  This speech concerns lawful activity, which, under the 
first prong of the Central Hudson test, is subject to regulation.  But al-
though the City proposes five interests to justify its restriction of 
commercial speech, none of these interests satisfies all four prongs of 
 
 141 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“We have permitted 
litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertain-
ing to different locales altogether . . . .” (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 
U.S. 618, 628 (1995))). 
 142 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 143 Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (“What 
our decisions require is a . . . fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; . . . 
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired objective.”); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 556. 
 144 See Went for It, 515 U.S. at 632 (“[W]e made clear that the ‘least restrictive 
means’ test has no role in the commercial speech context.” (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 
480)). 
 145 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (“In previous 
cases addressing this final prong of the Central Hudson test, we have made clear that if 
the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, 
or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”); City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (“[I]f there are numerous and 
obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is 
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and 
means is reasonable.”).  Notably, the Central Hudson test, although instructive, is va-
gue and leads to discrepancies in its results because the standard is applied different-
ly.  Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2000); see also Emily Erickson, Disfavored Advertising: Telemarketing, Junk Faxes and the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 589, 620 (2006).  Furthermore, some 
have even suggested that the doctrine be eliminated entirely.  See Lorillard, 533 U.S. 
at 554 (noting that several litigants have suggested to the Supreme Court that the 
Central Hudson standard be discarded in favor of applying strict scrutiny).  Nonethe-
less, Central Hudson has never been overruled by a majority of the Court.  See, e.g., 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
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the analysis; all fail at least one prong.  For these reasons, the City 
may not regulate commercial speech as set out in current version of 
the Lawn Litter Law. 
A. The Speech that the Lawn Litter Law Seeks to Regulate Is 
Commercial 
The crux of the Lawn Litter Law is that “unsolicited papers, 
fliers, pamphlets, handbills, circulars, or other materials advertising a 
business or soliciting business” are unlawful when the owner of a pri-
vate property has posted a sign prohibiting advertisers from distribut-
ing such materials on the property.
146
  The materials that the Lawn 
Litter Law addresses have consistently been within First Amendment 
protection.
147
  Handbills and fliers are essential to those businesses 
that lack the financial resources to conduct an advertising campaign 
on a grand scale.
148
  This Comment will illustrate the unconstitutio-
nality of the Lawn Litter Law by using the example of a takeout 
menu, which is a type of advertisement that businesses frequently 
leave on private property in New York City.
149
  Takeout menus certain-
ly come within the meaning of commercial speech as defined by the 
Supreme Court.
150
  Although references to a product or an economic 
motivation are not conclusive proof that an advertisement constitutes 
commercial speech,
151
 the Supreme Court has stated a common-sense 
approach must be used to determine commercial speech.
152
  For ex-
ample, a takeout menu is an advertisement that refers to specific 
products with an economic motivation behind the speech.
153
  As long 
as the DSNY will interpret the Lawn Litter Law to apply to takeout 
menus, the speech in such a menu will come under the commercial 
speech protections as defined in Central Hudson.
154
  This leads to the 
conclusion that takeout menus are examples of commercial speech 
and that any regulation prohibiting them is subject to analysis under 
Central Hudson. 
 
 146 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 397-a(1) (CONSOL. 2007 & SUPP. 2009). 
 147 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (noting that the 
distribution of literature consistently receives First Amendment protection). 
 148 Id. at 146 (“Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly fi-
nanced causes of little people.”). 
 149 See Chan, supra note 63, at B1. 
 150 See supra notes 115–124 and accompanying text. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978). 
 153 See Sprague, supra note 126, at 144. 
 154 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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B. Regulating Takeout Menus Satisfies the First Prong of the Central 
Hudson Test 
Takeout menus are examples of commercial speech subject to 
regulation under the first prong of the Central Hudson test that states 
that the regulated speech must concern lawful activity and must not 
be misleading.
155
  A typical restaurant’s takeout menu concerns lawful 
activity (selling food) and is likely not misleading (providing it gives 
accurate price and fee information).
156
  Without question, states have 
the authority to regulate commercial speech that is misleading or 
fraudulent, and the aim of this Comment is not to suggest other-
wise.
157
  Any unsolicited advertising that is misleading or fraudulent, 
regardless of whether it violates the Lawn Litter Law, is not afforded 
First Amendment protection—no issue of constitutionality arises.  
New York is free to prohibit as it sees fit any unsolicited advertising 
that is misleading, fraudulent, or advertises an illegal activity.  Be-
cause takeout menus concern lawful activity and are usually not mis-
leading, the State and City of New York may regulate them.  But be-
fore either the City or the State regulates these menus, it must satisfy 
all prongs of the Central Hudson test. 
C. The Government Has a Substantial Interest in Regulating Takeout 
Menus 
The second prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the 
governmental interest in regulating the commercial speech be sub-
stantial.
158
  The Governor’s Memorandum asserts two state interests 
for the Lawn Litter Law: protecting citizens against the annoyance 
and inconvenience of unsolicited advertisements and protecting the 
environment from litter caused by the distribution of materials that 
are either unwanted or unsecured.
159
  In its proposal to adopt the law, 
the DSNY merged the Governor’s interests with its own and set out in 
its Statement of Basis and Purpose five reasons for the law: reducing 
litter, preventing crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting its citi-
zens from nuisance, and protecting its citizens’ privacy.
160
  This Com-
 
 155 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 156 See id. 
 157 Id. at 563 (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activi-
ty.”). 
 158 Id. at 566. 
 159 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 160 See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 4–5. 
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ment proposes that the five interests set out in the DSNY’s statement 
do not satisfy the Central Hudson test. 
1. The City Does Not Have a Substantial Interest in 
Reducing Litter 
The City asserts that unsolicited advertisements can blow away in 
the wind and accumulate as litter on streets and sidewalks.
161
  Keeping 
the City clean is obviously an appropriate governmental interest, but 
the Court has held that protecting a city from litter is not a sufficient 
reason to abrogate First Amendment protection.
162
  The Court estab-
lished that “[t]he short, though regular, journey from mail box to 
trash can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned.”
163
  Thus, the City’s interest in reducing and pre-
venting litter cannot be deemed substantial.  The City, therefore, 
does not meet this prong of the Central Hudson test. 
2. The City Has a Substantial Interest in Preventing Crime 
The City’s interest in protecting its citizens from crime satisfies 
the second prong of the Central Hudson test.  Unsolicited materials 
can accumulate on private property when residents are away and 
create a potential for crime.  The fear is that burglars will notice the 
buildup of unwanted advertisements on the property and realize that 
no one is at home, which will thus make the property an easy target 
for burglary.
164
  Indeed, the DSNY concluded that the accumulation 
of unsolicited advertisements increases the potential for criminal ac-
 
 161 See id. at 4. 
 162 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).  The Court explained its 
position as follows: 
We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of 
good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits 
a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one 
willing to receive it.  Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in 
cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such 
distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom 
of speech and press. 
Id.  But see Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367–68 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The 
state’s interest here is in preserving aesthetics through the reduction of litter.”); Su-
persign of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Fort Lauderdale, 766 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that aesthetic improvement is a substantial governmental interest).  But the 
City, which bears the burden of proof, has not asserted aesthetics as a goal. 
 163 Lamont v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y 1967). 
 164 See Doherty, supra note 3 (“As [unsolicited advertising material] piles up while 
the homeowner is away on vacation, this material does its job in an unexpected way, 
‘advertising’ the fact that no one’s home, giving would-be robbers the green light to 
come in and help themselves.”). 
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tivity.
165
  Concededly, the state has a substantial interest in protecting 
its citizens from crime.
166
 
3. The City Has a Substantial Interest in Securing its 
Citizens’ Safety 
Unsolicited advertisements can accumulate in front of homes 
and in the lobbies of apartment buildings.  The DSNY suggests that 
this causes a safety hazard to the residents and visitors because “[t]he 
materials, when wet or covered with snow and ice, may cause a person 
to slip and fall.”
167
  The state has a substantial interest in protecting 
the safety of its residents.
168
 
4. The City Does Not Have a Substantial Interest in 
Protecting its Citizens from Nuisance 
Unsolicited advertisements can be a nuisance for those who do 
not want them but still must dispose of them.  “[T]he Court has con-
sistently recognized a municipality’s power to protect its citizens 
from . . . undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing.”
169
  
But the fact that courts recognize a municipality’s power to protect its 
citizens does not necessarily mean that protecting citizens from nuis-
ance is a substantial interest.
170
  The Court has also held that disposing 
of an unwanted advertisement is a small, tolerable cost of protecting 
free speech.
171
  Protecting citizens from nuisance resulting from the 
distribution of unsolicited advertisements is paternalistic; therefore, 
 
 165 See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 4–5. 
 166 Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616–17 (1976) (“[T]he 
Court has consistently recognized a municipality’s power to protect its citizens from 
crime and undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing.”). 
 167 See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 5. 
 168 See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995); Posadas de P.R. 
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986). 
 169 Hynes, 425 U.S. at 616–17; see also Pa. Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of 
Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1984).  But see Ohio Citizen Action v. City of 
Mentor-On-The-Lake, 272 F. Supp. 2d 671, 685 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“While the gov-
ernment’s interest in minimizing annoyance is legitimate, it is not, in and of itself, 
compelling enough to form the basis for a content-based restriction on free 
speech.”). 
 170 See Ohio Citizen Action, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 685. 
 171 Consol. Edison v. Pub. Srvc. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (“The custom-
er of Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by 
transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.”); Lamont v. Comm’r of 
Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“The short, though regular, 
journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the 
Constitution is concerned.”); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 72 (1983). 
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the Court is not likely to uphold it as a substantial interest.
172
  Thus, 
nuisance is not a substantial government interest and does not satisfy 
the second prong of the Central Hudson test. 
5. The City Does Not Have a Substantial Interest in 
Protecting its Citizens’ Privacy 
The City proposes that unsolicited advertisements invade the 
privacy of those who do not wish to receive this commercial informa-
tion.
173
  But a substantial invasion of a citizen’s privacy interest must ex-
ist before the government can intervene.
174
  When the Court has held 
privacy to be a substantial state interest, the government sought to 
protect its citizens from substantial harms associated with the abridge-
ment of privacy.
175
  Nothing about the subject matter here (takeout 
food) would substantially harm the privacy of citizens.  That is, busi-
ness advertisements do not substantially interfere with the privacy 
rights of citizens—the burden imposed on the recipient is minimal, 
the advertiser takes away no personal information, and the adver-
tisement is not even addressed to a specific person.  The First 
Amendment right of businesses should not give way when the harm 
(if any) to citizens is minimal and fails to constitute a substantial inva-
sion of their privacy.
176
  Thus, although privacy can be a substantial 
governmental interest, in this context, it is not because business ad-
 
 172 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.   
 173 See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 5. 
 174 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government, con-
sonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hear-
ing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests 
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”). 
 175 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620–25 (1995) (upholding 
thirty-day ban on attorneys contacting victims of accidents via direct-mail solicitation 
because it is an intrusion on privacy); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767–69 (1993) 
(holding that protecting the privacy of potential accounting clients is a substantial 
interest); Carey v. Brown 447 U.S. 455, 457, 471 (1980) (holding that protecting the 
sanctity of the home is substantial interest where picketers were protesting in front of 
mayor’s home); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 730–31 (1970) 
(upholding statute that allows mail recipient to elect not to receive what he thinks of 
as “erotically arousing or sexually provocative” material because of privacy concerns 
(quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964 Supp. IV))). 
 176 Consol. Edison v. Pub. Srvc. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (“The custom-
er of Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by 
transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.”); Lamont, 269 F. Supp. at 
883 (“The short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an accept-
able burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned.”); see also Bolger, 463 U.S. 
at 72 (“[W]e have never held that the government itself can shut off the flow of mail-
ings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended.”). 
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vertisements are not harmful and do not substantially invade citizens’ 
privacy interests. 
D. The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance All of the City’s 
Asserted Interests 
The Central Hudson test requires any law limiting commercial 
speech to directly advance the government’s interest in regulating it.  
The Lawn Litter Law only directly advances the City’s asserted inter-
est in reducing litter.  The law does not directly advance the asserted 
interests in preventing crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting 
its Citizens from nuisance, or protecting its citizens’ privacy and, 
therefore, fails the third prong of the Central Hudson test. 
1. The Lawn Litter Law Directly Advances the City’s Goal 
of Litter Reduction 
The reduction of litter is not a substantial governmental inter-
est.
177
  But for purposes of argument, this Comment supposes that the 
government has a substantial interest in eliminating litter that the law 
may directly advance.  The Lawn Litter Law may reduce the number 
of advertising materials that businesses distribute.  This is best illu-
strated in the case of one-, two-, and three-family homes where the 
owner displays a “no solicitation” sign.  In such a circumstance, the 
Lawn Litter Law mandates that no business may place unsolicited ad-
vertising materials at the residence; the owner has complete discre-
tion to ban all advertising materials from the property.  That is, the 
law does not require one-, two-, and three-family homes to provide a 
space for advertisers to leave materials if residents other than the 
owner wish to receive the materials.  To conclude that that Lawn Lit-
ter Law has directly advanced the government’s goal of reducing lit-
ter, it is necessary to assume that if such a sign is not posted by the 
owner of a one-, two-, or three-family home, any advertising left at 
that property will necessarily contribute to street litter. 
The difficulty arises, however, with multiple-dwelling buildings 
to which a significant drop in the number of distributed advertising 
materials may not occur.  The law requires that owners of multiple-
unit buildings obtain permission from every single owner or lessee
178
 
to completely prohibit unsolicited advertisements on the property.  If 
at least one owner or lessee does not agree to the prohibition, the 
 
 177 See supra Part IV.C.i. 
 178 In New York City, apartment buildings may have different ownership struc-
tures, such as cooperatives, condominiums, or rentals.  This Comment uses the term 
owner or lessee to refer to the inhabitants of apartments within multi-unit buildings. 
LEONARD FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:14 PM 
1798 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1775 
owner or manager of the building is required to designate a place for 
these materials.  While the designated location may be a place of 
temporary confinement for the materials, businesses may nonetheless 
deposit too many materials therein.  If such documents are not fre-
quently removed (whether by the owners who want this material or by 
the building’s management), the risk of these advertisements becom-
ing litter on the streets is just as high as if no regulation was in place 
at all.  So in that respect, the law does not directly advance the gov-
ernment’s interest.  Moreover, the government must show that the 
placement of unsolicited materials on private property leads directly 
to litter.
179
  The Lawn Litter Law aids in alleviating litter to a material 
degree but only to the extent that property owners elect to prohibit 
such materials.
180
  Therefore, although the regulation directly ad-
vances the asserted interest because of the possibility that unwanted 
advertisements will blow away and contribute to street litter, this di-
rect advancement is entirely dependent on citizens’ decision to pro-
hibit the advertising materials. 
2. The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the 
City’s Interest in Deterring Crime 
To satisfy the Central Hudson test, the City must show that the 
Lawn Litter Law directly advances the deterrence of crime.  Even 
though deterring crime is a substantial state interest, prohibiting un-
solicited advertising materials does not directly advance it.
181
  If the 
advancement of the interest is only remote, it does not comply with 
Central Hudson.
182
  Allowing owners to prohibit takeout menus on 
their property only advances the goal of deterring crime in the most 
remote way.  If the City can point to no evidence that the buildup of 
advertising materials leads to burglary,
183
 a court will not find that the 
interest directly advances crime prevention.
184
  Furthermore, the pro-
 
 179 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71 n.20 (“The party seeking to uphold a restriction on com-
mercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.”); Carroll v. City of Detroit, 410 F. 
Supp. 2d 615, 623 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“Because the original ordinance contains no 
statement of purpose and the City has provided no extrinsic evidence of its substan-
tial governmental interest in enacting the original ordinance, the ordinance fails to 
meet an essential element of the Central Hudson test and is, therefore, unconstitu-
tional.”). 
 180 See supra note 140. 
 181 Cf. Pa. Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (holding that ban on door-to-door canvassing after dark directly advances 
interest in deterring crime). 
 182 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 183 See supra note 179. 
 184 Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995). 
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hibition of advertisements does not deter burglary to a material de-
gree, as the law requires.
185
  If the City wants to deter crime, it should 
“vigorously enforce its criminal statutes”
186
 instead of infringing on 
the constitutional right to free speech.  Thus, the government’s as-
serted interest in deterring crime fails the third prong of the Central 
Hudson test. 
3. The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the 
City’s Goal of Securing its Citizens’ Safety 
As with deterring crime, only a weak connection exists between 
keeping citizens safe and allowing for the prohibition of unsolicited 
business advertisements.  To withstand the Central Hudson analysis, 
the regulation must advance the interest in a material way.  Here, 
prohibiting only business advertisements does not alleviate the harm 
to citizens’ safety to a material degree.
187
  Although residents or visi-
tors might slip and fall because of these unsolicited materials, the pos-
sibility of this occurring is too remote to entirely abridge the First 
Amendment right to commercial speech.
188
  Furthermore, the law 
does not cover other forms of protected speech; businesses may still 
distribute handbills that can accumulate on private property and pose 
the same risk to safety as takeout menus.  The law does not directly 
advance the safety interest because in singling out business advertis-
ing, it excludes all other forms of speech and the alleged danger such 
advertisements cause.  An unsolicited pamphlet proposing a particu-
lar candidate for office poses the exact same threat to citizens’ safety 
as a takeout menu might.  A citizen will be no safer simply because 
business advertisements are prohibited from private property.  Noth-
ing is inherently dangerous about business advertising distributed in 
this method when compared to all other forms of speech distributed 
in the same manner. 
Thus, the evidence that business advertisements (as opposed to 
all other speech) place citizens in harm’s way is tenuous at best.  This 
is critical to the third prong of the analysis because the regulation 
must materially advance the City’s interest in safety.189  If only a remote 
chance exists for the Lawn Litter Law to protect citizens, the law must 
 
 185 See supra note 139. 
 186 Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 356 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 187 See supra note 140. 
 188 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 189 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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be struck down.
190
  Prohibiting unsolicited business advertising from 
distribution on private property does not materially increase citizens’ 
safety because other types of speech that businesses distribute in this 
manner are just as likely to pose a safety risk.  Therefore, the regula-
tion does not directly advance the government’s interest in safety. 
4. The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the 
City’s Interest in Protecting Its Citizens from Nuisance 
Even if protecting citizens from nuisance qualified as a substan-
tial interest, the Lawn Litter Law does not directly advance it.  Citi-
zens will still be subject to the same “nuisance” from protected speech 
that businesses distribute by handbill or flier.  Thus, the prohibition 
of business advertising does not materially advance the interest in 
eliminating nuisance because unsolicited advertisements that are not 
business related (like political fliers of campaign information or pro-
test announcements) are just as likely to annoy citizens as are com-
mercial advertisements.  Moreover, nothing indicates that allowing 
citizens to prohibit business advertisements will alleviate nuisance in a 
material way. 
For owners of one-, two-, or three-unit properties, the law ad-
vances to some degree the goal of eliminating nuisance to property 
owners.  In these situations, the owner of the building has authority 
to prohibit the materials from the property and thus eliminate nuis-
ance to all residents.  But with respect to multi-unit residences, the 
law requires permission from all owners or lessees to prohibit these 
materials.
191
  If an owner or lessee withholds permission, the owner of 
the building must designate a place for businesses to secure the de-
sired materials.
192
  Although the law specifies that advertisers must 
place materials in one spot, having the advertisements in the building 
is arguably still a nuisance to many residents; once the designated lo-
cation is full of papers, someone must deal with it.  Furthermore, if 
owners or lessees want to take materials out of the pile, they could in-
advertently drop some of the ads—creating the exact problem that 
the Lawn Litter Law seeks to redress.  It is probably more of a nuis-
ance for the owner or manager of such properties to go door to door 
asking whether a specific tenant wishes to prohibit advertisements.  It 
 
 190 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
564 (1980) (“[T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or 
remote support for the government’s purpose.”); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996). 
 191 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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may also be an annoyance to update the sign each time a new tenant 
moves into the building.  Finally, the procedures for reporting a vi-
olation of the Lawn Litter Law may be more trouble than they are 
worth even without the requirement that the application be nota-
rized.
193
  The Lawn Litter Law does not directly or materially advance 
the goal of reducing nuisance and thus does not satisfy the third 
prong of the Central Hudson test. 
5. The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the 
City’s Interest in Protecting Its Citizens’ Privacy 
Unsolicited advertising materials are not a substantial invasion of 
privacy, but even conceding that privacy in this instance could be a 
substantial state interest, allowing owners to prohibit unsolicited ad-
vertising materials does not directly advance the goal of protecting 
privacy.  The law only prohibits business-advertising materials; it does 
nothing to prohibit other types of unsolicited speech from private 
property.  Thus, the law does not materially advance the City’s inter-
est in protecting the privacy of its citizens.  In terms of privacy, no 
material difference exists between commercial and non-commercial 
speech that is not inherently harmful.  In sum, the prohibition on 
business advertising does not directly advance the City’s asserted in-
terest in protecting the privacy of its citizens. 
Furthermore, there are ways to get around the law—business ad-
vertisers can simply place “more than a deminimus amount of news 
[and] publish[] [it] at least weekly”
194
 for exemption from liability.  
For example, a restaurant could simply insert a short section at the 
top of its takeout menu that gives an account of the restaurant’s pre-
vious week’s activities or of events taking place in the community.  As 
long as the restaurant publishes its takeout menu as modified on a 
weekly basis, it will be outside the purview of the Lawn Litter Law.  As 
such, the menus could continue to be just as problematic (as defined 
by the City’s interests) as they were before the law passed.  The prob-
lem could actually become worse because to circumvent the law, res-
taurants would have to publish weekly; before, restaurants may have 
been publishing and delivering their menus less frequently.  This is 
entirely contrary to the purpose of the Lawn Litter Law and is evi-
dence that the law does not directly advance the City’s goals. 
 
 193 See Lombardi, supra note 61, at 53. 
 194 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  But the addition of this type of in-
formation would not necessarily bring the advertisement within the realm of full First 
Amendment protection.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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E. The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary 
To satisfy the fourth and final prong of the Central Hudson test, 
the Lawn Litter Law must not be more extensive than necessary in 
advancing the interests of the government.
195
  The Lawn Litter Law is, 
however, more extensive than necessary in advancing each of the 
City’s five asserted interests, which are reducing litter, preventing 
crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting its citizens from nuis-
ance, and protecting its citizens’ privacy.  Thus, the Lawn Litter Law 
fails the Central Hudson test, and is unconstitutional. 
1. The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary 
in Reducing Litter 
Obviously, not every single piece of business advertising becomes 
litter.  By allowing property owners to ban the placement of all busi-
ness advertisements, this law is much more extensive than necessary.  
A blanket prohibition on the distribution of all unsolicited business 
advertisements is not a narrowly tailored way to achieve a reduction 
in litter.
196
  Although a showing of the least restrictive means is not 
the test, a court will consider in its analysis whether numerous less re-
strictive ways to accomplish the government’s goal exist.
197
  Methods 
unrelated to limiting speech can be used to achieve the government’s 
interest in this scenario.  First, the City could fine a business if its ad-
vertisements actually ended up on the streets as litter.  This option 
would encourage businesses to be careful about how they distribute 
their fliers.  Second, the City could require all property owners to de-
signate and maintain a secure place for unsolicited advertising to as-
sure that no materials become litter.  This would both directly ad-
vance the interest of the government and not be more extensive than 
necessary.  Finally, New York City already has litter laws that ade-
quately address street litter.  The City could put more effort into 
doing its job of maintaining a clean environment by enforcing its ex-
isting laws as opposed to passing new ones that restrict protected 
speech.
198
  Whereas the Lawn Litter Law as it stands now only ad-
 
 195 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 196 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 197 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 198 See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 31, § 753(a)(1)–(2) (2004), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/citycharter2004.pdf.  The law 
states that 
the commissioner shall have charge and control of and be responsible 
for all those functions and operations of the city relating to the cleanli-
ness of the streets and the disposal of waste, including, without limita-
tion, the following: (1) the sweeping, cleaning . . . of the streets; (2) the 
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vances the City’s interest if the property owner elects to prohibit the 
advertising materials, these less restrictive methods are not subject to 
an individual citizen’s unilateral decision to prohibit the advertise-
ments and, thereby, more directly advance the government’s interest.  
Thus, because other ways to advance the government’s goals of re-
ducing litter without encroaching on a business’s First Amendment 
rights exist, the regulation at issue is more extensive than necessary. 
2. The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary 
in Preventing Crime 
Allowing property owners to elect to ban all business advertising 
is much more extensive than necessary because not all such material, 
when left on property, leads directly to crime, such as burglary.
199
  No 
direct connection exists between business advertisements (as opposed 
to all other types of advertisements) and burglaries.  Although the 
possibility of the law actually preventing burglaries is remote, the cost 
to hundreds of businesses is certain: their First Amendment rights 
will suffer, and they will sustain substantial economic losses.  The law 
is overbroad because the connection between crime and business ad-
vertising accumulating on property is too attenuated.  The Lawn Lit-
ter Law is more extensive than necessary because it prevents the dis-
tribution of many more advertisements than it prevents criminal 
activity.
200
  Alternatively, requiring all property owners to designate a 
place for unsolicited advertisements will significantly reduce the pos-
sibility of piled-up materials causing a burglary.  Also, the City could 
increase police patrols in areas where burglaries are likely to occur or 
even require those patrolling to pay special heed to the properties 
that have accumulated a significant number of unsolicited advertise-
ments.  With other options available
201
 to protect citizens from crime 
without impinging on the First Amendment, the Lawn Litter Law is 
more extensive than necessary in advancing the City’s asserted inter-
est in preventing burglaries. 
 
removal and disposition of . . . street sweepings, garbage, refuse, rub-
bish and waste. 
Id. 
 199 See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 4. 
 200 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 201 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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3. The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary 
in Securing Citizens’ Safety 
Not every single business advertisement is a safety hazard.  In 
fact, not more than a very small number of unsolicited business ad-
vertisements actually cause physical injury.  Thus, prohibiting all such 
advertisements from private property is not a reasonable way of 
achieving the government’s interest.
202
  As the law is written, a reason-
able requirement to promote safety is that owners of multi-unit build-
ings designate a special location for advertisements for the benefit of 
owners or lessees who do not want to prohibit such materials out-
right.  But allowing owners to prohibit all or even a portion of these 
advertisements from their property to secure a minimal level of safety 
for the inhabitants is too restrictive.  If in the name of safety, the gov-
ernment wants to require some owners to designate a place for the 
materials to go, it should require all owners to do the same.  Requir-
ing everyone to designate a place for advertisements would allow for a 
reasonable fit.  Allowing the total prohibition of these materials is 
more restrictive than necessary and not a narrow fit in light of the 
fact that designating a place for them will eliminate the hazard that 
the government seeks to address. 
4. The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary 
in Protecting Citizens from Nuisance 
Even if nuisance was a substantial governmental interest that this 
regulation directly advanced, the Lawn Litter Law is still problematic 
because it is more extensive than necessary.  The law is narrowly tai-
lored in terms of allowing those citizens who live in multi-unit dwel-
lings to choose whether they want to receive unsolicited advertising.  
This means that residents who are annoyed by unsolicited advertise-
ments can ban them, but those who are not annoyed by the adver-
tisements still have the opportunity to receive them.  Although it may 
still be a nuisance to those who want to prohibit unsolicited advertis-
ing to deal with the designated, conspicuous location where business-
es will place the ads for the benefit of those who do want them, this 
part of the law is not more extensive than necessary.  But in terms of 
reducing the nuisance of those people living in owner-occupied two- 
and three-family homes, this law is more extensive than necessary.  In 
this case, the power to prohibit the advertising materials is vested 
solely in the owner of the building.  The other families living in the 
building may not find unsolicited advertising a nuisance, but they 
 
 202 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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have no say in whether to prohibit such materials at their residence.  
Moreover, other families may find the advertisements to be a nuis-
ance but have no power to prohibit them because the families do not 
own the building.  In conclusion, for the asserted governmental in-
terest in alleviating nuisance, this law is partially narrowly tailored 
and partially more extensive than necessary. 
5. The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary 
in Protecting Its Citizens’ Privacy 
Privacy only justifies prohibiting speech if the speech is harm-
ful.
203
  Here, arbitrarily prohibiting speech that is not necessarily 
harmful is more extensive than necessary.  The law is not narrowly tai-
lored because virtually all of these advertisements are not harmful; by 
definition, they simply propose a price for goods or services.  The 
government cannot allow citizens to ban all commercial advertising 
simply because of the possibility that some of the advertisements will 
be harmful to citizens’ privacy interests, which are already sufficiently 
protected; if a particular advertisement is harmful, the First Amend-
ment will not impede citizens’ efforts to ban it.  But the fear of such 
harm cannot justify the abridgement of businesses’ First Amendment 
right to advertise.  This is a paternalistic view of the issue that a court 
will likely not accept.
204
  As with nuisance, this law is more extensive 
than necessary in protecting the purported privacy interests of those 
who live in owner-occupied two- and three-family homes.  Only the 
owner has the power to prohibit unsolicited advertising; if the owner 
does so, the other families in that building do not have the option of 
obtaining unsolicited advertisements.  Thus, with respect to the City’s 
interest in protecting its citizens’ privacy, the Lawn Litter Law is more 
extensive than necessary. 
V. AMENDING THE LAWN LITTER LAW 
If New York City truly wants to reduce litter brought on by busi-
ness advertising, it should amend the Lawn Litter Law to simply fine 
those businesses whose advertisements actually end up on the street 
as litter.  For example, the amendment could read as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any representative of a business entity to 
cause or permit any unsolicited papers, fliers, pamphlets, hand-
bills, circulars, or other materials advertising a business or solicit-
ing business to become litter.  Any instance of any unsolicited ad-
 
 203 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 204 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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vertising material becoming litter shall be punishable by a fine 
not to exceed $100. 
Amending the law in this way would allow it to survive a constitutional 
attack under Central Hudson.  Moreover, the law would more directly 
serve the City’s interest in reducing the amount of litter on the 
streets.  By levying a fine against those businesses whose advertising 
materials actually become litter, the Lawn Litter Law as amended 
would deter businesses from carelessly distributing their advertise-
ments. 
At the outset, the City may regulate business advertising, such as 
takeout menus, because they are commercial in nature.
205
  Thus, the 
Central Hudson framework applies and allows for the regulation of this 
speech if all four prongs of the test are met.  Assuming that the ta-
keout menus convey content that is lawful and not misleading, the 
first prong of Central Hudson is satisfied.
206
 
For the purposes of argument, this Comment has assumed that 
the reduction of litter could be a substantial governmental interest.
207
  
Furthermore, if this interest in the reduction of litter were recharac-
terized as an interest in preserving aesthetics, the City would have an 
interest that would most likely withstand analysis under the first 
prong of the Central Hudson test.
208
  Thus, as a starting proposition, 
the City may regulate business advertising, including takeout menus, 
based on its interest in reducing litter and preserving aesthetic ap-
pearances. 
The next issue that the City faces is that any regulation that it 
imposes must directly advance its interest in preserving aesthetics.
209
  
If the Lawn Litter Law imposed a fine on any business whose adver-
tisements actually became litter, the City would be able to directly ad-
vance its goal of preserving aesthetics.  Everyone can agree that litter 
is not aesthetically pleasing.  Imposing a fine on businesses that leave 
on private property unsolicited advertisements that then become lit-
ter would serve as a deterrent to those businesses.  The fine would de-
ter careless distribution of advertising materials while removing the 
 
 205 See supra part IV.A. 
 206 See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra part IV.D.i. 
 208 Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367–68 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that states have a substantial interest in “preserving aesthetics through the reduction 
of litter”); Supersign of Boca Raton, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 76 F.2d 1528, 
1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The objectives served by the ordinance, traffic regulation 
and aesthetic improvement, undoubtedly qualify as substantial governmental inter-
ests.”). 
 209 See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
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prohibition on these materials that the current Lawn Litter Law al-
lows.  This deterrent would thus become an effective way to serve the 
interest in aesthetic preservation because it would target only those 
who actually litter.
210
  Moreover, the regulation would not advance the 
goal in a remote way; a direct connection would exist between the lit-
ter on the ground and the business that is fined.
211
  Thus, by fining 
based on actual litter, the amended regulation would directly ad-
vance the goal of aesthetic preservation. 
Finally, the amendment to the Lawn Litter Law must not be 
more extensive than necessary in serving the interest in aesthetics.
212
  
By fining only those businesses whose advertisements actually become 
litter, the amendment would satisfy this standard.  If the City were to 
use this deterrent method as opposed to the prohibition method cur-
rently in force, it could pinpoint exactly the problem that it faces.  
That is, by fining those businesses that actually litter, the City would 
be punishing only those businesses that are causing the problem.  Of 
course, a recipient of an advertisement could inadvertently drop a 
properly secured advertisement on the ground.  This may lead to in-
consistent results, but to satisfy this prong of the Central Hudson test, 
the regulation need only be reasonable—not perfect—in addressing 
the solution the City desires.
213
  Moreover, even if a fine arose because 
of a recipient rather than the business itself, it would further serve 
the City’s goal in preserving aesthetics because that business would be 
even more careful in how and where it distributes its advertisements.  
Thus, this amendment would make the Lawn Litter Law not more ex-
tensive than necessary to achieve the City’s goal of aesthetic preserva-
tion. 
Amending the Lawn Litter Law to act as a deterrent instead of 
an outright prohibition would put the burden on businesses to en-
sure that their advertisements are not causing the problem that the 
law seeks to remedy.  Furthermore, this amendment would take away 
the City’s ability to allow residents to categorically exclude such ad-
vertising from their property.  A law that acts as a deterrent instead of 
a prohibition would remind businesses that their right to freedom of 
speech is not absolute and would ensure that businesses remain re-
sponsible for their advertisements, but at the same time prevent the 
City from trammeling their free speech rights.  It would then become 
the responsibility of the City rather than the residents to collect evi-
 
 210 See supra note 138. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See supra note 142. 
 213 See supra note 143. 
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dence of any violation.  This is fair for two reasons.  First, the City 
wants to restrict commercial speech, and as such, the City should 
have the burden to bring up violations.  Second, the City has the re-
sponsibility to maintain “the cleanliness of the streets and the dispos-
al of waste.”
214
  Thus, not only would this amendment be fairer to 
businesses in terms of not categorically excluding this mode of 
speech, it would also be fairer in terms of allocating responsibility of 
enforcement to the government because the government is the one 
seeking to impose this regulation. 
If the legislature amended the Lawn Litter Law to simply fine 
the businesses that actually litter, the law would pass muster under 
the Central Hudson test.  The City has a substantial interest in preserv-
ing aesthetics, the amendment would directly advance this goal, and 
the amendment would not be more extensive than necessary in 
achieving this interest.  Thus, although that Lawn Litter Law is likely 
unconstitutional, this recommended amendment would allow the 
City to regulate business advertising in a way that is fairer both to the 
government and to businesses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Lawn Litter Law seeks to prohibit unsolicited advertising 
from private property.  This law, as adopted by New York City, is an 
unconstitutional abridgement of commercial speech in violation of 
the First Amendment that the legislature should amend lest the law 
fall under constitutional scrutiny.  Advertising materials that are 
commonly distributed on private property in New York City, such as 
takeout menus, fall within the definition of commercial speech be-
cause they propose commercial transactions.  Any restriction of 
commercial speech is subject to analysis within the framework set out 
in Central Hudson, which requires that for nonmisleading speech, the 
government must assert a substantial interest.  Furthermore, the reg-
ulation at issue must directly advance the interest and must not be 
more extensive than necessary. 
For each of its asserted interests (reducing litter, preventing 
crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting its citizens from nuis-
ance, or protecting its citizens’ privacy), the City fails the Central Hud-
son test on at least one of the prongs.  The City’s interest in keeping 
litter from the streets is not substantial.  Even if it were, the Lawn Lit-
ter Law does not directly advance this interest and is more extensive 
than necessary.  Although preventing crime is obviously a substantial 
 
 214 See supra note 196. 
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City interest, the regulation does not directly advance this interest 
and is more extensive than necessary.  Furthermore, while the City 
has a substantial interest in keeping its citizens safe, the Lawn Litter 
Law does not directly advance this interest and is more extensive than 
necessary.  Preventing nuisance is not a substantial City interest.  
Even if it were, though, the law does not directly advance this interest, 
and it is only partially narrowly tailored.  Finally, the City has a sub-
stantial interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens but only from 
substantial harm.  The regulated speech here is not harmful.  The law 
does not directly advance the City’s interest in privacy and is only par-
tially reasonably tailored.  Thus, because each of the City’s asserted 
interests fails on at least one of the test’s prongs, the Lawn Litter Law 
is an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech. 
In conclusion, New York City’s Lawn Litter Law is unconstitu-
tional because it restricts constitutionally protected commercial 
speech.  The City should not prohibit protected speech in this man-
ner.  The right to freedom of speech is a fundamental tenet of our 
democracy that the government cannot impede with impunity.  In 
Central Hudson, the Supreme Court explicitly delineated the criteria 
that the government must meet before it can restrict commercial 
speech.  The City does not meet all of these criteria; none of its five 
interests withstands scrutiny under all four prongs of the Central Hud-
son test.  Therefore, the City of New York’s regulation of business ad-
vertising as set out in the Lawn Litter Law is unconstitutional.  The 
New York Legislature should amend the law.  If left unamended, the 
law must be struck down. 
